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The case of Dubose v. Dubose' represents a departure from
the strict requirement that in an action for adultery "[t]he proof
must be sufficiently definite to identify the time and place of the
offense, and the circumstances under which it was committed. '2
In Dubose the wife sought a divorce, alleging that her husband
was having an affair with a woman referred to as a business
acquaintance of the husband. In the lower court there was persu-
asive evidence that the husband had committed adultery with
another woman who had not been named in the complaint. An
acquaintance testified that the husband and the second woman
had stayed together in a certain Myrtle Beach hotel "during the
summer of 1969."1 There was, however, no proof of the specific
times and circumstances of any of the alleged acts.
In affirming the divorce decree, the South Carolina Supreme
Court reiterated the requirement that proof of adultery must be
sufficiently definite to identify times, places, and circumstances.
Then, retreating, the court stated:
Insufficiency in this respect, however, should not be allowed to
defeat a divorce where the court is fully convinced that adultery
has, in fact, been committed and the defendant has had full
opportunity to defend against or refute the charge. For instance,
[proving] precise times and places might be exceedingly diffi-
cult for an innocent spouse who was unaware of otherwise
clearly proved adulterous conduct until long afterward.4
The court was convinced that the evidence was sufficient to es-
tablish that the husband had committed adultery because it
1. 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329 (1972).
2. The full test set forth in Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 512, 56 S.E.2d 330, 335
(1949), and used in subsequent South Carolina cases, was taken from 27A C.J.S. Divorce
§ 139(1) (1959) and reads as follows:
The proof of adultery as a ground for divorce must be clear and positive,
and the infidelity must be established by a clear preponderance of the evidence.
The proof must be sufficiently definite to identify the time and place of the
offense, and the circumstances under which it was committed.
3. 259 S.C. at 421, 192 S.E.2d at 330.
4. Id. at 423, 192 S.E.2d at 331.
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"includ[ed] approximate times, places and the circumstances of
such adultery." 5
B. Jurisdiction
In Seymour v. Seymour' a wife who had been granted a de-
fault divorce in Kansas brought an action in the Greenville Fam-
ily Court to have its provisions enforced. The husband attacked
the decree on jurisdictional grounds, but the trial court, giving
full faith and credit to the Kansas decree, enforced it.
In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the supreme court
simply restated the position adopted in State v. Campbell,' that
the full-faith-and-credit-clausel .' does not prevent inquiry into
whether the facts were sufficient to give another state jurisdic-
tion, even when the decree includes a recital that such facts ex-
isted. This holding is consistent with the court's traditional ap-
proach to foreign decrees.8
C. Property Settlements, Alimony, and Attorneys' Fees
A poorly drafted "Property Settlement Agreement" was the
center of controversy in McNaughton v. McNaughtonA The
agreement, which had been drafted before the action for divorce
was initiated, transferred to the wife the family business, the
lease agreement for the house in which the couple lived, and
virtually everything in which the husband had a property interest
except his car. The agreement, however, was ambiguous as to the
intent of the wife, or lack thereof, to relinquish her right to ali-
mony. Although two clauses indicated that she agreed to relin-
quish such right," two others seemed to indicate that the settle-
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. 259 S.C. 26, 190 S.E.2d 502 (1972).
7. 242 S.C. 64, 129 S.E.2d 902 (1963).
7.1 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
8. See Taylor v. Taylor, 229 S.C. 92, 91 S.E.2d 876 (1956); State v. Westmoreland,
76 S.C. 145, 56 S.E. 673 (1907).
9. 258 S.C. 554, 189 S.E.2d 820 (1972).
10. The agreement read in part:
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual benefits and to relieve the
said John R. McNaughton of any further financial responsibility to the said
Stella Marie McNaughton, the parties hereto agree as follows:
Seventh: Either party hereto is relieved one from the other of making any
claim for financial assistance and/or support from the other and neither party
shall assert any right thereto. Id. at 556-57, 189 S.E.2d at 821-22.
1973]
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ment would be binding only until either a court determined the
rights of the parties or an action for divorce was commenced."
Subsequent to the making of the agreement, the wife filed for
divorce on the grounds of desertion. She was awarded temporary
attorneys' fees and support pendente lite, but the final decree
granting the divorce denied her these emoluments. The trial
judge based his denial of support on the agreement. Although he
failed to classify the agreement, or to indicate whether it would
bar a future claim by the wife to alimony in the event of changed
circumstances, the judge apparently did not consider the agree-
ment to be a permanent property settlement:
After reviewing and carefully considering the evidence in this
case, I am convinced that the benefits derived by the Plaintiff
[wife], as a result of the Agreement, were substantial and suffi-
ciently adequate [sic] to absolve the Defendant of any present
financial responsibility. 12
The supreme court, while specifically upholding the finding
of the trial court that the wife was not entitled to alimony or
support at that time, hinted in dictum that the agreement might
have served as a property settlement barring any future claim by
the wife to support. Citing a legal encyclopedia, the court de-
clared: "[E]ven though circumstances might indicate that a
wife is entitled to alimony as a matter of right, still there is
nothing to prevent her relinquishment of such right.'
13
Unlike the McNaughton agreement, the "Separation and
Property Settlement Agreement" in Darden v. Witham" was a
clear, unambiguous contract that was intended to be a complete
settlement between the parties and was incorporated into the
divorce decree. It provided for yearly payments by the husband
11. The agreement provided:
Fifth: The said Stella Marie McNaughton does hereby release and dis-
charge the said John R. McNaughton from any further financial responsibility
until such time as a Court of competent jurisdiction determines the duties and
responsibilities that each has to the other and in consideration of the convey-
ances herein effected.
Sixth: The said Stella Marie McNaughton will not make claim for support
and/or alimony before such time as a suit for divorce absolute or a limited
divorce is instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and the above provi-
sions shall be considered and asserted as a defense to such claim. Id. at 557, 189
S.E.2d at 822.
12. Id. at 559, 189 S.E.2d at 822 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 558, 189 S.E.2d at 822, citing 24 Ahi. Jun. 2d Divorce and Separation § 523
(1966).
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to the wife for a period of twenty years, or until her death, which-
ever should first occur. There was a specific declaration that the
payments would continue during the twenty-year period regard-
less of her remarriage.
Nevertheless, when the wife did remarry, the ex-husband
sought a declaration relieving him of any further obligation to her
under the decree and agreement. Because a specific clause in the
agreement was ineptly entitled "Wife's Alimony," and because
payments were to be made in installments, the ex-husband urged
that under section 20-114 of the South Carolina Code'" such pay-
ments should cease upon the wife's remarriage. Alternatively, he
argued that he should be absolved of his obligation under section
20-116,'1 which provides that when a husband has been required
to make periodic payments of alimony pursuant to a divorce de-
cree, and the circumstances of the parties shall have changed,
either party may apply to the court for a decrease, increase, or
termination of the payments.
The trial and the supreme courts reached different conclu-
sions as to the nature of the agreement but the same conclusion
with respect to the merit of the husband's argument. The impor-
tant point, however, is that neither court considered the pay-
ments to be mere periodic alimony. Thus the trial court, following
Blakely v. Blakely,' 7 held that when a divorce court grants ali-
mony in gross or alimony in a lump sum, which is payable in
installments, the court cannot later modify the provisions unless
it has reserved the power to amend the decree. The supreme
court, however, chose to view the agreement as a property settle-
ment which, when incorporated into a divorce decree, ordinarily
cannot be amended. Reading the term "Wife's Alimony" as an
integral part of the entire agreement, the court determined that
what was designated "alimony" was actually a provision for in-
stallment payments of a single settlement. The payments were
therefore not subject to alteration or termination under either
section of the Code.
Another issue raised by the husband was whether attorneys'
fees could be awarded to the wife for defending against his action
contesting the property settlement. Under section 20-112 of the
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-144 (1962).
16. Id. § 20-116.
17. 249 S.C. 623, 155 S.E.2d 857 (1967).
1973]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss3/8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Code,".' a court may award "suit money" to the wife in a divorce
action if her claim for it appears well founded. In the 1961 case
of Collins v. Collins,17 .2 the court held that this section does not
apply to fees resulting from litigation unrelated to the divorce.
But in Darden the court found that, although the husband's ac-
tion had been treated as a declaratory judgment, it was in essence
an outgrowth of the original divorce action, and an award of attor-
neys' fees to Mrs. Witham was therefore proper. 17.3
11. PARENT AND CHILD
A. Jurisdiction
In Webster v. Clanton" Mrs. Clanton sought custody of her
deceased sister's teenage son. After a hearing in December, 1970,
the court decided that it was in the child's best interest to remain
with his father. The following April Mrs. Clanton, without notice
to the father, obtained an order from the same court awarding
custody of the child to her. The order was based on the teenager's
oral complaint, a review of his school grades, and a conference
with a guidance counselor who did not know the father. No appeal
was taken at that time. However, when Mrs. Clanton subse-
quently obtained an order requiring the father to pay support and
medical expenses for the child, the father readily appealed.
In a per curiam opinion the supreme court declared that the
April custody order was a judgment affecting the personal rights
of the father and that, since he had not been afforded notice or
an opportunity to be heard, the order was a nullity. Thus it was
not necessary for him to appeal the void judgment to protect his
rights. Because the subsequent support order was based on the
void custody order, it also was invalid and could not bind him.
This case is simply a restatement of the general law regarding the
17.1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-112 (1962).
17.2. 239 S.C. 170, 122 S.E.2d 1 (1961).
17.3. The matter was remanded to the lower court where it was determined that
$175,000 was a reasonable fee. The husband appealed the award to the state supreme
court, arguing that section 20-112 was unconstitutional under the equal protection and
due process clauses. He also attempted to raise the same questions in the federal district
court in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. (1970). The federal action was
dismissed, however, on the grounds of comity because at the time no decision had been
reached in the state supreme court. Darden v. Witham, Civil No. 73-103 (D.S.C. June 7,
1973).
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requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard in personal
judgments.'9
B. Custody
In custody disputes the primary consideration of the courts
is always the best interest and welfare of the child. When the
master appointed in a case and the trial judge disagree as to what
is in the child's best interest, it is the duty of the supreme court
to make this determination based upon its own view of the evi-
dence.2" In Mathis v. Johnson2' both the grandparents and the
great-aunt and uncle of the minor were found to have suitable
homes. The supreme court upheld, against a contrary conclusion
by the master, the finding of the county judge that the four-year-
old, illegitimate child should remain with her great-aunt and
uncle, with whom she had lived since shortly after birth. The
court noted that these were the only persons whom the child had
known as parents, and that the child's mother had visited the
home and found the child happy and comfortable.
Without citing authority or clearly defining its position, the
court in O'Shields v. O'Shields2 tacitly reaffirmed the traditional
rule that, all other things being equal, custody of young children
is best entrusted to their mother. 23 In a very brief opinion, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court's rejection of inferences of
immorality on the part of the mother drawn by the master from
his finding that the mother lived in an apartment with other
young women who were divorced or getting divorced, and that the
home was visited by unattached males at all hours. Custody of
the couple's four-year-old adopted daughter was therefore
awarded to the mother.
In another custody case, Moorhead v. Scott, 24 the court dealt
with what constitutes a change in condition sufficient to warrant
a change in custody. It found that adjustment problems in the
household only three weeks after the remarriage of the mother
who had custody of the children were not sufficient. The court
19. See 46 AM. JuR. 2d Judgments § 22 (1969).
20. Ex parte Atkinson, 238 S.C. 521, 121 S.E.2d 4 (1961). See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
115, 31-51 (1962).
21. 258 S.C. 321, 188 S.E.2d 466 (1972).
22. 193 S.E.2d 523 (S.C. 1972).
23. See Poliakoff v. Poliakoff, 221 S.C. 391, 70 S.E.2d 625 (1952); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 220
S.C. 437, 68 S.E.2d 348 (1951).
24. 193 S.E.2d 510 (S.C. 1972).
1973]
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noted that the remarriage of a divorced mother has often been the
basis for a change in condition sufficient to merit a change in
custody.2 Unlike the situation in Moorhead, however, subsequent
marriages are usually brought to the attention of the court when
the newly married parent wishes to obtain custody.
The court in Moorhead also reviewed its attitude toward a
child's preference for one parent in custody cases: "It is clear that
the wishes of a child of any age may be considered under all
circumstances, but the weight given to those wishes must be dom-
inated by what is best for the welfare of the children.""8 Without
indicating the ages of the Moorhead children, the court decided
that the trial judge had not erred in giving some weight to their
desires. It also cited cases in which little weight was given to the
wishes of a six-year-old child,2 and great significance accorded
those of a sixteen-year-old.21 Then, taking judicial notice of what
may be the heart of the problem, the court declared that




Expressing reluctance, the court in a per curiam opinion re-
versed the decision in Sayler v. Parler0 and remanded the case
to the Court of Common Pleas, Orangeburg County, for a new
trial. Although it did not review the facts, the supreme court
found that the issues in this custody proceeding had "simply not
received the required judicial consideration by the trial court
.... 31 The court less than six months earlier in Shecut v.
Shecut 32 had reversed and remanded another judgment to the
same court for the same reason. The court in Shecut did not base
its decision to reverse on any previous South Carolina authority.
Perhaps the court, although expressing trepidation, will use this
approach as a means of assuring that divorce and custody issues
are given more careful attention at the trial level so that they may
receive a thorough review on appeal.
25. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 363 (1955).
26. 193 S.E.2d at 513.
27. Poliakoff v. Poliakoff, 221 S.C. 391, 70 S.E.2d 625 (1952).
28. Guinan v. Guinan, 254 S.C. 554, 176 S.E.2d 173 (1970).
29. 193 S.E.2d at 513.
30. 258 S.C. 514, 189 S.E.2d 294 (1972).
31. Id. at 517, 189 S.E.2d at 295.
32. 257 S.C. 354, 185 S.E.2d 895 (1971).
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For the guidance of the trial court on remand, the supreme
court in Sayler restated the South Carolina law pertaining to the
extent that the full-faith-and-credit-clause 3 requires recognition
of a custody judgment of another state. Although the United
States Supreme Court in Ford v. Ford34 avoided deciding the issue
of whether the clause applies to divorce decrees, the court noted
that the general rule is that such decrees, absent fraud or want
of jurisdiction, are given the same effect in other states with
regard to the facts existing at the time of the decree. 5 But such
decrees are given no greater force or effect than in the state in
which they have been rendered. Therefore, they do not prevent a
custody change by the court of another jurisdiction which is based
upon a subsequent and substantial change of condition. 6
ADELE JEFFORDS GRIMBALL
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
34. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
35. 258 S.C. at 518, 189 S.E.2d at 296.
36. 24 AM. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 998 (1966); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889
(1947); Hartley v. Blease, 99 S.C. 92, 82 S.E. 991 (1914).
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